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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a personal injury case arising out of a fall down a staircase at an office building in 
Meridian, Idaho. Plaintiffs-respondents James and Gale Phillips sued defendants-appellants Milt 
and Mary Erhart, the building owners, for negligence and wil1ful and wanton misconduct in 
maintaining the stairs (R. Vol. I, p. 9-16). Defendants denied liability (Id. at p.l7-20). 
Procedural History 
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A trial by jury began on April 1, 2009. Defendants moved for a directed verdict on the 
ground that plaintiffs failed to prove proximate causation and willful and wanton misconduct (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 921,. L.8 to p. 822, L. 5). The court denied defendants' motion, and on April 9, 2009, 
the jury awarded James Phillips $546,175 and $562,000 in economic and non-economic 
damages, respectively; it awarded Gale Phillips $556,200 for loss of consortimn (R. Vol. II, p. 
336, L. 22 to p. 337, L. 1; Tr. Vol. I, p. 924, L. 1-5). The jury specially found that Milt Erhart's 
conduct was willful and reckless (Tr. Vol. II, p. 336, L. 16-18). The court entered judgment on 
April 14, 2009 (Id at p. 338). 
On April 27, 2009, defendants filed a post-trial motion requesting judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial on liability and/or damages, or remittitur (R. Vol. II, p. 
340-67). On July 7, 2009, the court denied defendants' post-trial motion for judgment or a new 
trial on liability (R. Vol. III, p. 564-84). It granted a new trial as to James Phillips' economic 
damages unless Phillips accepted a remittitur to $253,014.49 (Jd at p. 582-83). Phillips accepted 
the remittitur, and on July 15,2009, the court entered an amended judgment reflecting it (Id at p. 
584-85). On August 6,2009, defendants timely filed a notice of appeal (Jd at p. 588-97). 
Plaintiffs did not file a notice of cross-appeal. 
Statement Of Facts 
Facts Re: The Insufficiency Of Evidence As To 
The Actual Cause Of James Phillips' Accident 
On March 20,2006, James Phillips, age 33, was injured at work when he fell down the 
lower section of an outdoor staircase at an office building in Meridian, Idaho [Tr. Vol. I, p. 286, 
7 
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L. 20 to p.288, L. 10; PI. Ex. 3a; A. 2 (photo»). The lower level was comprised often steps 
starting at a sidewalk on the ground and leading to a landing [Tr. Vol. I, p. 60, L. 14-17; PI. Ex. 
la; A. 3 (photo»). From the landing, stairs ascended in the opposite direction to the second floor 
landing (Tr. Vol. I, p. 60, L. 19-21). Phillips worked for Regional Community Assistance 
Corporation (RCAC) on the second floor (R. Vol. III, p. 523 at p. 4, L. 3; Tr. Vol. I, p. 286, L. 
13-22). 
The accident was not witnessed. Phillips, who is 6'5" tall and weighs 340-50 Ibs, 
testified that he has no memory of how it happened (Tr. Vol. I, p. 287, L. 18 to p. 288, L. 10; p. 
396, L. 3-5). Phillips did not identify where or why he lost his balance (Tr. Vol. I, p. 287, L. 18 
to p. 288, L. 10). He only recalled that he was taking a trash box from his office and that he 
walked down a stairwell and then smelled broken concrete (Id.). Phillips was found lying face 
. I down on the concrete at the base of the stairs (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 147, L. 20-24). A 12-inch tall trash 
! box was found close to him (Tr. Vol. I, p. 149, L. 16-17; p. 704, L. 23 to p. 705, L. 3) . 
. I 
Plaintiffs' human factors expert Richard Gill attempted to identify the cause of the 
accident (Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, L. 5-11). Gill opined that the staircase had several defects (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 215, L. 9-10). It lacked a horizontal railing on the landing to connect the handrails on the 
two levels (Id. at p. 215, L. 10 to p. 217, L. 18). The handrail was a few inches lower than 
required by the current building code (ld. at p. 217, L. 21 to p. 218, L. 21). The handrail on the 
left side of the lower section (descending) was not fully attached to the metal railing [/d. at p. 
220, L. 7-14; PI. Ex. Ig; A. 4 (photo)]. Gill testified that the eighth step from the bottom was not 
properly secured to a support bracket and that the seventh and eighth steps were not perfectly 
8 
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parallel [ld. at 226, L. 9 to p. 228, L. IS; PI. Ex. Ib; A. 4 (photo)]. He believed that the eighth 
step had shifted on the right side (descending) (ld. at p. 227, L. 4-10). The eighth and ninth steps 
were not secured on that side (Id. at p. 231, L. 24 to p. 232, L. 2). Gill noted that a lag bolt had 
been replaced and that another had sheared (Id. at p. 232, L. 3-4). Gill admitted to not knowing 
whether that condition existed at the time of the accident (Id. at p. 275, L. 3-19). Gill also opined 
that the handrails on the staircase were too wide to be "graspable" (Id. at p. 236, L. 22 to p. 238, 
L. 1). 
Gill acknowledged Phillips' telling medical personnel that he did not know how he fell 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 256, L. 23-25). Gill was unaware whether Phillips tried to grab a handrail as he 
fell (ld. at p. 269, L. 19-22). He does not know Phillips' location on the steps when he fell (ld. at 
p. 269, L. 23 to p. 270, L. 3). Gill could not opine that "anyone of them is likely to have 
caused" the accident (ld. at p. 251, L. 12-13). Instead, Gill believes that Phillips likely lost his 
balance in the "region" of the "interaction of all of [the defects]" (Id. at p. 251, L. 13-16) . 
Gale Phillips' hearsay statement regarding causation was ruled inadmissible. 
At the start of trial, defendants moved in limine to exclude as inadmissible hearsay a 
handwritten statement of Gale Phillips made part of an emergency room record (R. Vol. II, p. 
223, L. 3-4; p. 226, L. 19 to p. 227, L. 15; Tr. Vol. I, p. 2, L. 17 to p. 3, L. 17). The statement 
read: 
Walking downstairs, step moved, guardrail moved and fell. Legs, 
eyes, head, neck, face, back, elbows. A lot of bumps and bruises 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 889, L. 15-17). 
The court reserved ruling on its admissibility (Id. at p. 2, L. 17 to p. 3, L. 17). 
9 
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Without first requesting a side bar or otherwise alerting the trial court and defendants, 
during Gale Phillips' examination her attorney read the statement to the jury as part of a question 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 889, L. 12-18). Defendants objected, and the court sustained the objection (Id. at 
p. 890, L. 1-15). Gale Phillips immediately testified that her statement was accurate (Id. at p. 
890. L. 16-20). During closing argument and again without notice, plaintiffs' counsel repeated 
the previously barred statement (Id. at p. 1006, L. 2-18). 
In denying defendants' post-trial motion, the court reaffirmed that the statement was 
inadmissible (R. Vol. III, p. 572, L. 21 to p. 573, L. 8). 
Dr. Greenwald offers hearsay regarding the fall. 
Based on her medical records, physiatrist Nancy Greenwald testified that in April 2006, 
Phillips told her that he remembered the first two or three steps (Tr. Vol. I, p. 320, L. 17 to p. 
321, L. 23). According to Greenwald, "[h]e says that he felt like the rug was pulled out from 
under him" (Id. at L. 23-24). He did not remember the actual fall (Id. at p. 323, L. 22-24). 
Greenwald did not testify that Phillips explained the cause of his fall. She also did not indicate 
that Phillips had attempted to grasp the handrail or that any step had moved. 
Facts Re: The Insufficiency Of Evidence Of Willful And Wanton Misconduct 
The building and its upkeep 
Defendants purchased the office building in 1996 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 129, L. 22-25). It housed 
50-70 people spread evenly across two floors (Id. at p. 127, L. 7-10). 
Over the years, Milt Erhart gained experience in building construction and maintenance. 
While a pastor, he was a general contractor for the construction of two churches (Tr. Vol. I, 
10 
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p. 89, L. 16-19). In 2002, he was the general contractor on a new office building (Id. at L. 19-
21). Other than electrical, plumbing, or drywall issues, Erhart tried to handle building 
maintenance (Id. at p. 58, L. 16 to p. 59, L. 11). At the time of the accident, Erhart's primary job 
was managing his building (Id. at p. 95, L. 15-18). Safety was "very important" to Erhart, and he 
worked to keep his buildings in good repair (Id. at p. 93, L. 8-10, 14-21). 
Erhart decides to repair the staircase. 
The building was constructed around 1986, and by 2003 the stairs were deteriorating (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 61, L. 9-20; p. 130, L. 3-6). The stairs were carpeted plywood; the handrails were 
grooved two-by-fours (Id. at p. 130, L. 14-24). Although the staircase was covered, strong rain 
or snow occasionally fell on the steps (Id. at p. 61, L. 12-17). Erhart believed that they could be 
unsafe (Id. at p. 62, L. 1-4). After consulting with a carpeting contractor, Erhart concluded 
carpeting was not a satisfactory solution (Id. at p. 131, L. 4-11). "I thought it was time to 
upgrade [the staircase]" (Id. at L. 12-13). 
Erhart had previously retained Pacific Steel, a local contractor, to construct a stairwell at 
another building (Tr. Vol. I, p. 131, L. 14-20). Pacific Steel had also constructed the stairwells at 
a local hospital (Id. at p. 131, L. 15-19). Erhart liked Pacific's work and consulted with Pacific 
on the upgrade project (Id. at p. 131, L. 20-21). Pacific saw problems with tearing down the 
staircase (Id. at p. 131, L. 22 to p. 132, L. 4). The dimensions would be hard to match, and 
removing the beams connecting the steps could affect the roof support (Id.; p. 132, L. 5-14). 
Pacific recommended that Erhart himself install new steps and handrails; Erhart followed the 
recommendation (Id. at p. 131, L. 22-24; p. 133, L. 18-20). 
11 
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The new steps and handrails 
At Pacific's recommendation, Erhart purchased steel-reinforced, high-density concrete 
steps (Tr. Vol. I, p. 133, L. 18-20; p. 934, L. 13-14). The steps met building code standards (Id. 
at p. 934, L. 4-8). Each step weighed 107 Ibs. (Id. at p. 934, L. 10-13). The steps would be 
connected to stringers by means of two 8-inch steel angle irons mounted underneath the steps 
(Id. at p. 934, L. 15-22). On each side of a step, two bolts would attach an angle iron to a 
stringer; two other bolts would attach the angle iron to the step [Id. at p. 62, L. 15 to p. 63, L. 6; 
PI. Ex. Ie; A. 6 (photo)]. 
Pacific recommended that Erhart install Trex Decks handrails; Erhart purchased them at 
BMC West (Tr. Vol. I, p. 103, L. 3-10). The literature accompanying the handrails states that 
Trex Company "complies with all major model building codes and has been evaluated by the 
International Code Council evaluation service" [Id. at p. 112, L. 9-12; PI. Ex. 7 at third page, A. 
9]. Plaintiff offered no evidence that at the time of installation, Erhart knew or believed that the 
handrails did not comply with building codes. 
No building permit was needed. 
Erhart did not obtain a building permit for the work because the job involved repair rather 
than major remodeling (Tr. Vol. I, p. 107, L. 4-22; p. 134, L. 10-18). Plaintiffs offered no 
evidence that any local or state building code required Erhart to obtain a building permit for the 
work. Plaintiffs' experts did not testify that City of Meridian ordinances required a permit. 
Their expert Richard Gill testified that he did not even check (Id. at p. 262, L. 24 to p. 263, L. 1). 
Plaintiffs offered no evidence that Erhart consciously disregarded any alleged requirement to 
12 
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obtain a building permit. They also offered no evidence that if Erhart obtained a permit, the 
accident could have been avoided. 
Erhart installs the stairs. 
Erhart and a handyman helper performed the repair work over the first weekend of 
November 2003 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 135, L. 24-25). On Saturday, they barricaded the staircase and 
removed the steps and handrails; on Sunday they replaced them (Id. at p. 63, L. 22 to p. 64, L. 5). 
Working upward from the sidewalk, Erhart and his helper attached the concrete steps (Id. at p. 
83, L. 6-13; p. 85, L. 16-20). All went well until the eighth and ninth steps (ascending). A 
spread in the left-side stringer prevented Erhart from making four-bolt connections on that side 
(Id. at p. 68, L. 3-10; p. 90, L. 18-21). Erhart preferred a four-bolt connection on each step, and 
he explored alternatives (Tr. Vol. I, p. 69, L. 5-10; p. 90, L. 22 to p. 91, L. 9). Although Erhart 
was able to use washers to jerry-rig a solution on the upper level, he believed that the spacing 
was too great to use washers on the lower level (Id. at p. 68, L. 15 to p. 69, L. 2-3). Erhart 
testified that he could have used wooden shims, but plaintiffs did not ask him whether he 
consciously rejected the use of shims at the time of installation (Id. at p. 81, L.23-25). 
Erhart was concerned about finishing the staircase on time because tenants would return 
the next day (Tr. Vol. I, p. 82, L. 5-19). Because it was Sunday, Erhart did not ask Pacific Steel 
or the manufacturer for advice (Id. at p. 84, L. 4-15). During the repairs, Erhart and his helper 
walked the stairs many times, and the stairs did not move (Id at p. 85, L. 13-21). "We did check 
it out. There was no movement in the steps" (Id. at p. 67, L. 10-12). Because the two steps were 
"tight" and "solid" without bolting the angle irons to the steps, Erhart concluded that using only 
13 
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two bolts on the left side was safe (ld. at p. 67, 1. 2 to p. 68, 1. 2; p. 84, 1. 16-20). Plaintiffs 
offered no evidence that Erhart ever believed that the two steps were unsafe. 
Erhart replaces the existing handrails. 
As part of his repair work, Erhart replaced the existing two-by-four handrails with 
handrails reconunended by Pacific Steel (Tr. Vol. I, p. 104, 1. 11-14; p. 106, 1. 15-22). At the 
time of the accident, the Uniform Building Code required the upper-and-lower section handrails 
to be connected, or alternatively, to protrude twelve inches beyond the steps (ld. at p. 103, 1. 16 
to p. 104, 1. 10). Plaintiffs offered no evidence that Erhart knew about this requirement when he 
installed the handrails. Erhart only testified that he knew about it by the time of trial (ld. at p. 
104,1.4-10). 
Contrary to the handrail literature, Gill testified that the handrails purchased from BMC 
West were too wide under UBC standards [ld. at p. 103,1. 11-16; PI. Ex. 7 (third page)]. 
Plaintiffs offered no evidence that Erhart knew about the discrepancy at the time of installation. 
Erhart testified that he knew about the problem at the time of trial (ld. at p. 104,1. 1-4). 
Shortly after the accident, an investigation revealed that the right-side (ascending) 
handrail on the lower level was not attached at its higher end to the railing (Tr. Vol. I, p. 98, 1. 1-
6; A. 4). Erhart was surprised to learn of the problem, and he could not explain it (ld. at p. 98, 1. 
9 to p. 99, 1. 9). Erhart believed that he and his handyman had fully attached the railing (ld. at p. 
98, 1. 11-23). Plaintiffs offered no evidence that Erhart intentionally left the handrail 
unattached. 
Erhart regularly maintains the staircase following the repair work. 
14 
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The repairs were in place for about 2-1/2 years prior to the accident (Tr. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 
10-13). During that period, tenants used the staircase daily (Id. at p. 136, L. 5-16). 
Plaintiffs' witness Wanda Jenks had used the staircase four or five times prior to the 
, 
accident (Tr. Vol. I, p. 701, L. 17to p. 702, L. 2). Jenks typically used the handrails (Id. at p. 
702, L. 3-5). She neither had problems with the steps and handrails nor saw anyone struggling 
with them (ld. at p. 658, L. 6-13). Phillips' co-worker Angela Sisco had used the steps for 2-112 
weeks prior the accident (ld. at p. 504, L. 16-19; p. 546, L. 1-7). She did not notice problems 
with the staircase, nor did she complain about it (Id. at p. 546, L. 10-20). 
Sisco stated that she was not surprised by the condition of the stairs (Tr. Vol. I, p. 530, L. 
6). According to Sisco, repairs "were either half-assed completed or not done or pushed off' (ld. 
at p. 530, L. 4-6). Sisco admitted that she did not complain directly to Erhart but instead to the 
person in charge of maintenance (Id. at p. 530, L. 7-12). 
The only evidence of a complaint about the staircase carne from tenant Kenneth Doolittle 
(Id. at p. 141, L. 1-12). He stated that at least one step on the lower level jiggled when he used it 
(Id. at p. 142, L. 20 to p. 143, L. 11). Doolittle "actually tried to move it, and it moved more 
than a couple inches for me." * * * "If you pressed on it hard enough, you can get it to move" 
(ld. at p. 143, L. 13-15; p. 144, L. 5-7). Doolittle could not recall which step was loose (Id. at p. 
142, L. 15-17). In late winter/early spring 2006, Doolittle told Erhart about the steps (Id. at p. 
143, L. 15-24). Plaintiffs did not offer any evidence as to Erhart's reaction. A self-described 
"safety nut," Doolittle brought other building issues to Erhart's attention (Id. at p. 145, L. 6-10). 
According to Doolittle, Erhart's "typical response" was to thank him for the information (Id. at p. 
15 
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145, L. 13-17). Doolittle testified that Erhart would neither purposefully neglect problems nor 
hurry to resolve them (Id. at p. 145, L. 15-21). Plaintiffs did not question Erhart about the 
conversation with Doolittle regarding the loose stair. 
Erhart testified that he went to the building weekly and walked the steps each time (Ir. 
Vol. I, p. 136, L. 20-22). If Erhart was working on tenant improvements, he might use the steps 
several times daily (Id. at L. 22-25; p. 137, L. 1). Erhart was aware that the second step from the 
bottom would slightly wiggle if purposely manipulated (Id. at p. 86, L. 4-8; p. 87, L. 10-14). He 
regularly retightened its bolts because the original bolts were incorrectly sized (Id. at p. 87, L. 
15-23). Ultimately, Erhart purchased different bolts, and he believed that the step had been 
repaired well before the accident (Id. at p. 87, L. 23 to p. 88, L. 14). 
Following the accident, Doolittle finds no problem with the steps. 
Doolittle was in his second floor office at the time of the accident (Ir. Vol. I, p. 147, L. 
6-15). He walked down the stairs to help Phillips, who was lying on the sidewalk (Id. at L. 13-
24). Doolittle did not notice any problems with the steps: 
1266325.1 
In fact, that was the first thing I thought of was, well, maybe he 
slipped because of the stair, the stair that--none of the stairs were 
out of alignment that I could notice. And I did look for that very 
reason, because I thought, well, maybe its because of this issue that 
I had previously brought up to Mr. Erhart. 
* * * 
I made a quick glance to see if the stair was the cause of his fall, 
and I did not see that the stair was out of alignment. And I also did 
not know where he started to fall, and I still don't. 
But I asked myself if that was the reason, so I specifically looked 
at the stairs. So it was more than a passing glance to see if stair 
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was an overt cause from its appearance. (Id. at p. 148, L. 8-15; p. 
156, L. 14-23). 
Doolittle walked up and down the steps but did not observe them to be misaligned (Id. at p. 152, 
L. 11-17). 
Plaintiffs' expert witnesses did not offer evidence of willful and wanton misconduct. 
Plaintiffs' mechanical expert Thomas Fries testified that Erhart's work did not meet code 
construction standards and that the steps and handrails were deficient (Tr. Vol. I, p. 159, L. 4-
17). Fries agreed that the two-by-four handrails were unsafe and that a worn carpet could create 
a trip hazard (Id. at p. 183, L. 22 to p. 184, L. 7). He had no problem with Erhart's goal of 
upgrading the steps (Id. at p. 184, L. 8-11). 
Plaintiffs' expert Gill opined that Erhart should have implemented a safety and risk 
management program and that the failure to do so resulted in safety defects (Tr. Vol. I, p. 20 I, L. 
17 to p. 202, L. 10). Gill testified that he did not determine whether the City of Meridian 
required a building permit (Id. at p. 262, L. 24 to p. 263, L. 1). 
Neither Fries nor Gill testified that Erhart acted with conscious indifference or disregard 
to known safety risks. And neither testified that there was a high degree of probability that harm 
would actually result from Erhart's work. 
The trial court refuses to dismiss the willful and wanton misconduct claim. 
In denying defendants' motion for directed verdict, the court stated that the evidence of 
recklessness was not substantial but was sufficient (Tr. Vol. I, p. 924, L. 1-5). In denying 
defendants' jnov motion, the court stated: 
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I have considered the testimony of Mr. Erhart in the context of this 
motion. He does acknowledge that he had a duty as a landlord to 
keep a safe premises; that it was his decision to leave out the two 
bolts; and that he did not consult the manufacturer or his supplier 
in making the decision. He acknowledged that a shim would have 
allowed the two bolts to be put in place, but he chose not to use 
one because of the time involved. He acknowledged his repair to 
the stairway did not comply with the Uniform Building Code in 
many respects. This was just some of the evidence in the record 
from which a jury could conclude Mr. Erhart was not as concerned 
with safety as he stated. There was also testimony from Mr. 
Doolittle that he advised Mr. Erhart of a loose tread. 1 Given the 
testimony of Dr. Gill regarding the need for a safety plan, Mr. 
Erhart's statement that he felt free to vary from code requirements, 
and the testimony ofMr. Fries that the building code is a minimum 
safety standard, a jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Erhart 
was aware that his repairs to the stairs created a high degree of risk 
of injury. A jury could likewise conclude that the injury to 
someone was likely. They could also conclude that Mr. Erhart 
should have known these things, given his hands on management 
of his rental property. (R. Vol. III, p. 570,1. 18 to p. 571, 1. 9). 
In denying defendants' new-trial motion, the court stated: 
After weighing the evidence and evaluating the testimony of the 
witnesses, the Court is not convinced the jury's finding that Mr. 
Erhart was reckless is contrary to the weight of the evidence. 
Some of that evidence is set forth above regarding the motion for 
judgment n.o.v. The Court is not prepared to say the Court would 
reach the sarne conclusion as the jury, but that is not the test. 
Motions for a new trial are, to some extent, an exercise in second 
guessing the jury. But there are limits. There is substantial, 
conflicting, credible evidence that could lead to either result. This 
Court has enormous respect for juries and the collective wisdom 
they represent. In this case, it is, considering all of the evidence, a 
close question on whether Mr. Erhart should be found to be 
The court's footnote stated: "There is no evidence in the record as to which tread it was. 
Nor was Mr. Erhart questioned about Mr. Doolittle's warning. There are other misstatements or 
mischaracterizations of Mr. Erhart's testimony in Plaintiffs' brief, but that does not mean there 
was no evidence" (Tr. Vol. III, p. 571,1. 17-20). 
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reckless. Given that, it was for the jury to decide. (R. Vol. III, p. 
577, L. 5-14). 
Facts Re: Loss Of Consortium Award 
Gale Phillips sought damages for the loss of her husband's consortium. The jury 
awarded her $556,200.00 in non-economic damages, only $5,800.00 less than the non-economic 
damages awarded to her husband (R. Vol. II, p. 336, L. 25 to p. 337, L. I). Erhart claims that 
Gale Phillips' award is excessive. 
Phillips' fall caused a closed-head injury with contusions on a leg, abrasions on his face 
and/or neck, a tom right rotator cuff ultimately requiring surgery, a disc problem in the T11-12 
area, a broken jaw and a broken tooth (Tr. Vol. I, p. 421, L. 14-17, p. 433, L. 20-24, p. 311, L. 
19-25, p. 312, L. 1-12, p. 367, L. 5-7, p. 904, L. 4-7). He came to the emergency room fully 
immobilized and was agitated, anxious, and intermittently confused and forgetful (Id. at p. 417, 
L. 3-11). Phillips received large doses of morphine for severe pain (Id. at p. 413, L. 18 to p. p. 
414, L. 20). 
Following the accident, Phillips was treated for traumatic brain injury and post-
concussive syndrome (Tr. Vol. I, p. 312, L. 15-17; p. 437, L. 12-21). Physicians testified that 
Phillips and his wife reported forgetfulness, decreased short-term memory, blurred vision, 
difficulty with light exposure, problems with sleeping, balance, dizziness, nausea, hot flashes, 
taste changes, trouble focusing and spelling, and personality changes (Id. at p. 437, L. 8-16). 
Phillips was crying and occasionally irritable (Id. at p. 324, L. 25 to p. 325, L. 12). He had 
anxiety and fatigue issues and had problems with distractibility, attention, concentration and 
speech, balance, and gait (Id at p. 348, L. 18-25; p. 349, L. 1-2). Phillips suffered mild cognitive 
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deficits and depression and a little post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Jd. at p. 347, L. 3-8; p. 
349, L. 16-18). Phillips was treated by occupational medicine physicians, a physiatrist, 
psychologist, and physical occupational and speech-cognition therapists (Jd at p. 588, L. 23 to p. 
589, L. 13). He was placed on several medications, at least four of which are permanent (Id. p. 
440, L. 11 to p. 441, L. 24). He developed a nervous eye tick following the accident (Jd. at p. 
619, L. 21 to p. 620, L. 2). At the time of trial a physician testified that Phillips was still very 
anxious, nervous and fidgety (Id. p. 440, L. 6-10; p. 442, L. 11-16). Although Phillips has made 
improvement, his physicians testified that he suffered permanent disabilities from the accident 
(Id. at p. 385, L. 22 to p. 386, L. 6; p. 609, L. 21 to p. 610, L. 9). 
Non-medical personnel also testified to Phillips' impairments. Former supervisor George 
Schendler testified that Phillips had significant memory issues, needed to take notes, and 
physically shook (R. Vol. III, p. 489 at p. 29, L. 7-16). Co-worker Angela Sisco testified that 
Phillips was no longer a funny, gregarious, and outgoing person at work (Tr. Vol. I, p. 525, L. 9-
16). Co-worker Ron Sundberg testified that Phillips struggled with memory and organization 
(Id. at p. 639, L. 21 to p. 640, L. 14). Phillips' post-accident performance ratings fell below 
expectations (R. Vol. III, p. 527 at p. 19, L. 5-12). 
Phillips also suffered injuries affecting his life outside the office. Once an avid hunter 
and diver, Phillips had trouble with both because of the accident. Sundberg testified that Phillips 
became afraid ofthe water and could no longer dive (Tr. Vol. I, p. 632, L. 15 to p. 633, L. 2). 
His friend Ted Hyslop testified that Phillips became uncomfortable driving his own boat (Id at 
p. 693, L. 6 to p. 694, L. 4). On hunting trips, Phillips would get easily disoriented and become 
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lost if left alone (Id at p. 690, L. 20 to p. 692, L. 23). Neighbor Linda Larson testified that he 
wonld get very frustrated and cry over mistakes (Id at p. 843, L. 15 to p. 846, L. 10). 
Plaintiffs' marriage and home life suffered. Plaintiffs met in high school and had been 
married for 17 years at the time of the accident (Tr. Vol. I, p. 281, L. 20 to p. 282, L. 8). Phillips 
described his wife as his "rock" and who with his two children were the best part of his life (Id 
at p. 282, L. 4-8). Gale Phillips testified that prior to the accident Phillips was romantic and was 
her best friend (Id at p. 871, L. 4 to p. 872, L. 6). They worked well together in dealing with the 
challenges of two special needs boys (Id at p. 869, L. 8 to p. 870, L. 22; p. 877, L. 14 to p. 879, 
L. 3). Gale Phillips believed that before the accident they had a "really good marriage" (Id at p. 
872, L. 11-12). 
Following the accident, Phillips' personality changed; he became uncharacteristically 
angry, upset, and agitated (Tf. Vol. III, p. 895, L. 12-19). Gale Phillips needed to help her 
husband with his job tasks (Id at p. 898, L. 20 to p. 901, L. 3). Phillips became very moody and 
began to call her "really bad names" (Id at p. 901, L. 14 to p. 902, L. 7). Phillips could no 
longer cook for the family and help their sons with homework (Id at p. 909, L. 25 to p. 910, L. 
1). Their sons' friends could not come to the house because they made too much noise for 
Phillips (Id at p. 910, L. 1-9). 
Gale Phillips testified that her husband "is not [in] our unit anymore. It's not a -- we're 
not that tight knit, joking with each other and, you know, 'How was your day?' I miss that so 
much" (Id. at p. 910, L. 12-15). She is angry that her sons cannot speak to Phillips about 
subjects that require a father's involvement (Id. at p. 913, L. 13 to p. 914, L. 8). Phillips' 
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I 
physician recommended that Gale Phillips take anti-depressant drugs and seek counseling (Id. at 
p. 912, L. 12-16). The couple lost intimacy (Id. at p. 914, L. 13-23). Until the day of trial, 
Phillips had not touched his wife (Id). Gale Phillips was using learned techniques to slowly 
regain the intimacy in their marriage (Id. at p. 915, L. 2-8). 
At trial plaintiffs offered evidence tarnishing Erhart. Angela Sisco testified that Erhart's 
building repairs "were either half-assed completed or not done or pushed off' (Tr. vol. I, p. 530, 
L. 4-6). During closing argument, plaintiffs argued that Milt Erhart worked with a "reckless 
perspective on a stairway" (Tr. Vol. I, p. lOB, L. 2-3). Plaintiffs called Erhart "a reckless fellow 
who can't take responsibility for what he's done" (Id. at p. 1016, L. 8-10). Plaintiffs requested 
$1 million as to Gale Phillips' claim (Id. at p. 1052, L. 9-10). They linked their request to the 
alleged losses of the family unit: 
[A $1 million request] says it, I tell you. That says what these 
values are. That says we, as a society, value this part of the harms 
and losses that this family has and is and will endure. 
Is a million dollars enough? Of course not. But a million dollars 
says the right thing. I'd say the last line of the verdict form, that's 
what should go there. 
Do you have to? No. Is it the right thing to do? I submit to you it 
is. You've seen the losses to this family that has made the right 
choices. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 1052, L. 11-22) 
The jury's award to Gale Phillips was almost 99% of her husband's non-economic damages 
award and over 50% of his total award (R. Vol. II, p. 336, L. 23 to p. 337, L. 1). 
Defendants moved for a new trial or remittitur in part on the ground that the loss of 
consortium award was excessive (R. Vol. II, p. 340, L. 5, p. 341, L. 3; p. 359, L. 19 to p. 362, L. 
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8; R. Vol. III, p. 421, 1. 11 to p. 425, 1. 8; Tr. Vol. II, p. 13,1. 4-15). The trial court denied the 
motion (R. Vol. III, p. 577, 1. 15 to p. 580, 1. 4). The court stated that it was surprised but not 
shocked by each of the non-economic damage awards (Id. at p. 579, 1. 7-9). The court would 
have awarded each plaintiff lower amounts for non-economic damages (Id.). The court found 
Gale Phillips to be "somewhat over-dramatic and self interested" (Id. at p. 579, 1. 3) Although 
the court failed to calculate precise awards, it did not believe that the awards were so high "as to 
show the jury was operating under the influence of passion or prejudice" (Id. at p. 580, 1. 1-4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence of the actual cause of 
Phillips' fall? 
2. Whether plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence of willful and wanton 
misconduct? 
3. Whether Gale Phillips' loss of consortium award is excessive? 
ARGUMENT 
I. Erhart Is Entitled To Judgment Or A New Trial Because Of Plaintiffs' Failure To 
Prove Proximate Cause. 
This Court reviews de novo the denial of motions for directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 774, 203 P.3d 702, 704 (2009); 
Carlson v. Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 646, 200 P.3d 1191, 1195 (2009). The motions must be 
granted if, considering the evidence most favorably to the non-movants, reasonable mind could 
not have reached the jury's conclusion. Bates, 146 Idaho at 774-75, 203 P.3d at 704-05. A new 
trial should be granted if a verdict "is not supported by substantial competent evidence or is 
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against the clear weight of the evidence." Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 879, 204 P.3d 508, 
519 (2009). This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a new trial. Id. 
Under either standard, plaintiffs' jUdgment should fall. 
A. There was no evidence of actual cause. 
A plaintiff must prove every element a negligence claim, including causation. Cramer, 
146 Idaho at 873, 204 P.3d at 513. Proximate cause has two components: actual cause and legal 
cause. Id. at 875, 204 P.3d at 515. "'Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular 
event produced a particular consequence.''' Id. 
There must be substantial evidence that a defendant's negligence actually caused injury. 
Actual cause must be proved with reasonable certainty. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 
Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). Although a verdict may be based on circumstantial 
evidence, it must not rest on conjecture. Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 Idaho 1, 10-11,256 P.2d 
215,220-21 (1953); Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 722, 726-
27,735 P.2d 1033, 1037-38 (1987); Elce v. State, 110 Idaho 361, 363, 716 P.2d 505, 507 (1986). 
Where an accident occurs in an area surrounded by many hazards, there must be substantial 
evidence that at least one was a proximate cause of the accident. See, Elce, 110 Idaho at 368, 
716 P.2d at 512. Splinter states: 
1266325.1 
[Plaintiff) must establish circumstances of such nature and so 
related to each other that his theory of liability is the more 
reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom; and that where the 
proven facts are equally consistent with the absence, as with the 
existence, of negligence on the part of defendant, the plaintiff 
has not carried the burden of proof and cannot recover. 
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286 P. 2d at 607 (emphasis supplied); Dent v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 86 Idaho 427, 434, 388 
P.2d 92, 93 (1964). "The evidence is not sufficient if it established no more than that [injury] 
might" have been caused by the defective condition. Macaw v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 49 
Idaho 151,286 P.2d 606, 607 (1930). Circumstances merely consistent with liability are 
insufficient. Splinter, 74 Idaho at 11-12,256 P.2d at 221. 
For example, in Dent, an insurance policy authorized payment for injuries caused in a car 
accident. Decedent's car struck a bridge post. No one witnessed the accident. Decedent was 
found unconscious in his car, with bleeding from his nose and mouth. He died while receiving 
emergency treatment. The cause of death was a cerebral hemorrhage. Plaintiff s estate claimed 
that the accident caused the hemorrhage. Defendant claimed that the hemorrhage caused the 
accident. Plaintiff s medical expert recognized that either conclusion was reasonable. This 
Court ruled that decedent's estate failed to prove its claim. 86 Idaho at 433-36,388 P.2d at 92-
95. 
Likewise, in Henderson v. Cominco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 518 P.2d 873 (1974), 
plaintiffs claimed that defendant's herbicide killed their crops. But plaintiffs could not rationally 
explain why some crops sprayed with the herbicide did not die. Finding that a jury could only 
speculate as to the cause of the crop damage, the court reversed judgments for plaintiffs. 95 
Idaho at 699, 518 P .2d at 882. 
In Elce, plaintiff s decedent was killed when his truck flipped on an S-curve in a 
construction zone. Plaintiff's expert offered evidence that roadside conditions approaching the 
S-curve did not meet design standards and that those conditions might cause a driver to tum too 
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abruptly. However, the court ruled that there was no evidence that the conditions actually caused 
decedent to over-correct his truck. 110 Idaho at 368, 716 P.2d at 512. Affirming a directed 
verdict for defendant, the court ruled that the evidence merely involved conjecture as to 
causation. ld. 
Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines, Inc., 82 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1996), is very helpful to 
Erhart. Plaintiff was standing in a middle of a bathtub when she fell. She had no recollection 
whether her feet were on the non-skid strips. She offered expert testimony that the wide gaps 
between the non-skid strips rendered the tub defective and caused her falL ld. at 71. However, 
the expert also testified that the presence of oil or soap on the tub floor could also have caused 
thefall. ld. at 74. 
The Third Circuit held that plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence of causation. ld. 
at 75. "A mere possibility of causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure 
speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of 
the court to direct a verdict for the defendant." ld. quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B. 
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A hypothetical illustrates the point. A company provides a 
stairway in which some of the stairs are defective and some are in 
fine condition. A person falls on the steps, but does not know 
which step she fell on. No evidence is introduced that tends to 
prove she stepped on the defective step. The injured party simply 
testified that she walked down the steps and fell. We may not 
reasonably infer that the defective steps probably caused her 
injury merely because she may have stepped on a defective stair. 
Without evidence establishing a likelihood that the injured party 
stepped on the defective stair, ajury would be left to speculate as 
to the cause of the injury. Simply put, increased risk of harm due 
to a defendant'S negligence, standing alone, does not permit an 
26 
inference that an injury, more probably than not, was caused by 
the negligence. 82 F.3d at 75-76 (emphasis supplied). 
Here, plaintiffs failed to offer substantial competent evidence that Erhart's conduct 
actually caused Phillips' fall. Phillips had no memory of how and why he fell (Tr. Vol. I, p. 287, 
L. 16 to p. 288, L. 10). He only remembered walking down the steps and then smelling concrete 
(Id). Phillips did not testify to which of the two sets of steps he remembered (Id). Phillips may 
have lost his balance on the landing or on any of the ten lower-section steps. He did not testify 
that any steps moved. He did not testify that he noticed, touched, or reached for any handrail. 
Plaintiffs offered no eyewitness to the accident. Essentially, plaintiffs' claim is based on an 
unwarranted assumption that a 6'5",340-50 lb. man carrying a 12-inch tall box with one or both 
hands could not have tripped on stairs absent negligence. 
B. Plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient. 
To support a verdict, evidence must be substantial and competent. Johannsen v. 
Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347 (2008) quoting Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. 
Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 324, 179 P.3d 276,287 (2008). "Competent evidence" is evidence from 
a witness whose testimony is based on facts within their personal knowledge or otherwise 
verifiable information. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881,187 P.2d 1253, 1256 (2008). In 
Fedorczyk, the court rejected an expert's testimony that inadequate spacing of the non-skid strips 
caused plaintiff s fall. The testimony was inadmissible as not based on direct or circumstantial 
evidence of plaintiffs location when she fell. 82 F.3d at 75. 
The same is true with Gill's testimony here. Gill admitted to not knowing Phillips' 
location when he lost his balance; it could have been on any step (Tr. Vol. I, p. 269, L. 19 to p. 
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270, 1. 4). He does not know which alleged deficiency in the staircase actually caused the 
accident (Id at p. 251, 1. 12-13). That means he does not know if any deficiency caused it. 
After all, Phillips could have just overshot a step or even tripped on his owu feet. The box may 
have blocked Phillips' dowuward vision at a critical moment and also prevented him from 
regaining his balance. Gill based his opinion solely on the notion that the alleged defects created 
a game of "Russian roulette" where "the laws of probabilities are such that everything aligns 
right and an accident happens" (Id at p. 212, 1. 2-4; p. 213, 1. 1-3). But Gill had no evidence 
that Phillips ever tried to use the handrails. He had no evidence that a 107 lb. concrete stair 
moved when Phillips put up to 350 lbs. of dowuward force on it - Phillips' owu body weight. 
And given that there were only two partially secured stairs, it was more probable that Phillips 
lost his balance on the landing or on one of the other eight stairs. Gill's "opinion" about 
causation had absolutely no foundation in the facts. It is unsupported speculation and conjecture. 
Likewise, Gale Phillips' inadmissible hearsay testimony about the cause of Philips' fall 
did not support the judgment. LR.E. 801(c), 802. Gale Phillips' testimony was particularly 
unreliable because her husband had little memory of the event and no memory of the fall (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 287, 1. 16 to p. 288, 1. 10). So defendants could not cross-examine Phillips about the 
accident. The trial court correctly ruled that Phillips' hearsay statement about the cause of her 
husband's fall was inadmissible (R. Vol. III, p. 572,1. 21 to p. 573,1. 8). Her statement "could 
only be speculation on this record" (Id at p. 573, 1. 7-8). 
Also unreliable and incompetent was Dr. Greenwald's testimony that Phillips 
remembered the rug being pulled out from under him (Tr. Vol. I, p. 321, 1. 20-24). The 
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statement was contained in Dr. Greenwald's notes, which makes it inadmissible hearsay -just 
like the statement of Gale Phillips. Given Phillips' memory loss, it was not subject to cross-
examination. Ultimately, it was not probative as to the cause of the accident. It failed to explain 
why Phillips fell (Tr. Vol. I, p. 131, L. 2-13). 
There is not a scintilla of competent evidence that Phillips fell because of a dangerous 
condition. Linking his accident to Erhart's conduct requires speculation and conjecture. 
Reasonable minds could not differ. Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor. At the 
very least, the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, which entitles defendants to 
a new trial. 
II. Plaintiffs Failed To Prove Willful And Wanton Misconduct. 
To obtain more than the statutory maximum for non-economic damages, plaintiffs needed 
to prove that Milt Erhart was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. I. C. §6-1603(I) and 
(4)(a). They failed to offer evidence that Erhart had a reckless mental state. Defendants are 
entitled to judgment or a new trial. The previously discussed standards of review are applicable. 
This Court applies the definition of willful and wanton misconduct found in the civil jury 
instructions: 
1266325.1 
The words "willful and wanton" when used in these instructions 
and when applied to the allegations in this case, mean more than 
ordinary negligence. The words mean intentional or reckless 
actions taken under circumstances where the actor knew or should 
have known that the actions not only created an unreasonable risk 
of harm to another, but involved a high degree of probability that 
such harm would actually result. 
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o 'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 14 n. 1,72 P.3d 849, 854 (2003), quoting ICn 2.25. 
The trial court gave that instruction here (R. Vol. III, p. 321, L. 2-6). Willful and wanton 
misconduct is not synonymous with negligence or gross negligence. S. Grifjin Construction, Inc. 
v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 189, 16 P.3d 278,286 (2000). That is because willful and 
wanton misconduct requires a reckless mental state. 
The word "reckless" is not defined by the instruction, but its meaning is well recognized. 
Reckless conduct requires an "intentional disregard" for safety or a "conscious indifference to 
consequences." Hayslip v. George, 92 Idaho 349, 352,442 P.2d 759, 762 (1968). Recklessness 
involves "an act or conduct destitute of heed or concern for consequences; especially foolishly 
heedless of danger, headlong or rash, wanton disregard, or conscious indifference to 
consequences." Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17,27,375 P.2d 184, 190 (1962) (emphasis supplied) 
(interpreting guest statute); Hunter v. Horton, 80 Idaho 475,479,333 P.2d 459,462 (1958) 
(same). These terms imply "a consciousness of danger and a willingness to assume the risk, or 
an indifference to consequences." Hunter, 80 Idaho at 479, 333 P.2d at 462, quoting Mason v. 
Mootz, 73 Idaho 461, 468, 253 P.2d 240, 243 (1953). This Court has adopted the Restatement of 
Torts' distinction between recklessness and negligence: 
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Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important 
particulars. It differs from that form of negligence which consists 
in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to 
take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a 
possible or probable future emergency in that reckless misconduct 
requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with 
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with 
knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any 
reasonable man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned 
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form of negligence, but also from that negligence which consists in 
intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk of 
harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize that 
his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than 
that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The 
difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving 
only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is 
a difference in degree of risk, but this difference of degree is so 
marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind. 
Wilson v. Bacon, 78 Idaho 389, 390, 304 P.2d 908 (1956) (emphasis supplied); Smith, 85 Idaho 
at 28,375 P.2d at 190-91. Willful and wanton misconduct involves a deliberate "so what!" or "I 
don't care!" attitude in the face of a consciously known or reasonably apparent risk of a high 
probability of harm. It differs from negligence like speeding on a playground differs from 
speeding on an expressway. It is substantially a difference in kind, not just in degree. 
There is no evidence that Erhart was consciously indifferent to a high probability of 
harm. Erhart repaired the staircase precisely because he was concerned about safety. He 
realized that the wooden stairs were deteriorating and that the carpeting was aging. Erhart 
decided to upgrade the staircase for safety reasons (Tr. Vol. I, p. 138, L. 15-22). In the exercise 
of due care, Erhart consulted Pacific Steel, a reputable contractor whose good work was known 
to him (Tr. Vol. I, p. 131, L. 14-21). Pacific told Erhart that a complete staircase tear-down was 
inadvisable (Id at p. 131, L. 22 to p. 132, L. 14). Pacific recommended that Erhart purchase new 
steps and that he install them himself, recommendations that Erhart followed (Id. at p. 131, L. 
22-24; p. 133, L. 18-20). Heeding a professional's recommendation is the antithesis of a 
conscious indifference to a high probability of harm. 
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Erhart's purchase of recommended staircase materials also showed a due regard for 
safety. Pacific Steel recommended steel-reinforced, high-density concrete steps, each weighing 
107 lbs. (Tr. Vol. J, p. 876, L. 10-14). They fully complied with building code standards (Id. at 
p. 934, L. 4-8). There is no evidence that at the time of purchase Erhart was aware of any 
problems with them. The Trex Decks handrails, also a Pacific-recommended product, came 
from BMC West (Id. at p. 103, L. 3-10). Plaintiffs offered contradictory evidence regarding 
whether the handrails were code-compliant. Gill's opinion notwithstanding, the handrail 
literature stated that Trex Decks "complies with all major model building codes and has been 
evaluated by the Intemational Code Council evaluation service" (A. 9). Plaintiffs offered no 
evidence that Erhart purchased the handrails knowing that they failed to meet standards. The law 
does not require Erhart or any other consumer to research professionally recommended building 
materials for code compliance. Nothing about the size or shape of the handrails would have 
given Erhart reason to believe that they were deficient. 
Erhart tried to exercise care in installing the steps and handrails. He enlisted extra 
manpower (Tr. Vol. J, p. 64, L.4-5). He worked on a weekend, which minimized both 
inconvenience to tenants and the risk of accidents (Id. at p. 63, L. 24 to p. 64, L. 3). Erhart and 
his helper installed the first seven steps without any problem. 
At the eighth and ninth steps, they encountered an unexpected problem. Over the years, a 
stringer had spread, which prevented the proper alignment of the steps to the angle irons (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 68, L. 3-10; p. 90, L. 18-21). Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the problem was 
foreseeable. Erhart preferred a four-bolt connection, and he explored various options to make it 
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happen (Id. at p. 69, L. 5-10; p. 90, L. 22 to p. 91, L. 9). Erhart was able to use washers to rig a 
solution on the upper level, but he did not believe that washers would work on the lower level 
(Id at p. 68, L. 15 to p. 69, L. 10). Plaintiffs offered no evidence that Erhart believed otherwise. 
Erhart was worried about finishing the steps on time because his tenants would retum to work 
the next day (Id at p. 82, L. 5-12). Because Erhart was working on Sunday, he did not consult 
with the manufacturer or supplier (Id. at p. 84, L. 10-12). Erhart had walked up and down the 
staircase many times during the installation process, and the 107 Ibs. steps did not move (Id. at p. 
85,1. 13-21). "We did check it out There was no movement in the steps" (Id. at p. 67, 1. 10-
12). Because the steps felt tight and solid without a four-bolt connection, Erhart concluded that 
using only two bolts would work (Tr. Vol. I, p. 67, 1. 2-18; p. 79, L. 16-20). At worst, Erhart's 
conduct was negligent. But no evidence suggests that Erhart was consciously indifferent to a 
high probability ofharrn. A contrary reading would wrongly tar Erhart with a JekylllHyde 
mental state: interested in safety until he hit that eighth step, when suddenly he couldn't care 
less about it. 
As for the detached handrail, plaintiffs offered no evidence of conduct worse than 
negligence. Erhart was surprised to learn that the handrail was unattached at one end; he could 
not explain it (Tr. Vol. I, p. 98, 1. 9 to p. 99, 1. 9). Assuming that Erhart was inattentive, that 
was not enough to establish willful and wanton misconduct. "[I]nadvertence, incompetence, 
unskillfulness, or failure to take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with the 
possible or probable future emergency" is evidence of negligence. Smith, 85 Idaho at 28, 375 
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P .2d at 191. There is no evidence that Erhart let one end of the handrail remain unattached, 
consciously indifferent to a high probability of harm. 
Following the installation, Erhart tried to keep the steps in good repair. He was present at 
the building at least weekly and walked the steps each time (Tr. Vol. I, p. 92, L. 23 to p. 93, L. 
2). When involved with tenant improvements, he might use the steps several times a day (Id. at 
p. 136, L. 20 to p. 137, L.l). Erhart regularly re-tightened bolts under the second step 
(ascending) to eliminate a slight wiggle (Id. at p. 86, L. 4-8; p. 87, L. 1-23). Ultimately, Erhart 
solved the problem by installing different bolts (ld. at p. 87, L. 23 to p. 88, L. 1). Once again, 
Erhart's conduct demonstrated a conscious regard for safety. 
Plaintiffs offered evidence that tenant Kenneth Doolittle noticed that at least one step on 
the lower section jiggled (Tr. Vol. I, p. 142, L. 20 to p. 143, L. 11). When Doolittle purposely 
pushed on the step, it moved more than a couple inches (Id. at p. 143, L. 13-15; p. 144, L. 5-7). 
In late winter/early spring 2006, Doolittle told Erhart about the problem (Id. at p. 143, L. 11-24). 
This evidence did not create a jury question as to willful and wanton misconduct. The critical 
issue is not what Doolittle told Erhart. It is how Erhart reacted. On this score, plaintiffs offered 
nothing. Plaintiffs did not ask Erhart about the conversation. Doolittle did not comment about 
Erhart's reaction. Doolittle only testified that on other occasions Erhart "typical[ly]" thanked 
Doolittle for information about the building (Id at p. 145, L. 13-17). According to Doolittle, 
Erhart typically neither purposely neglected a problem nor hurried to resolve it (Id. at p. 145, L. 
15-21). Doolittle's testimony about other occasions did not provide evidence of willful and 
wanton misconduct on this occasion. 
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Moreover, plaintiffs did not offer evidence that Erhart ignored Doolittle's comment about 
the steps. Shortly after the accident, Doolittle looked at the steps to determine whether the 
previously reported step was out of alignment (Tr. Vo!' I, p. 148, 1. 8-15; p. 156, 1. 14-23). He 
gave the steps more than a passing glance but did not notice any problem (Id at p. 156, L. 21-
23). 
The evidence as to willful and wanton misconduct was insufficient for another reason. 
There must be more than a likelihood of injury. A plaintiff must prove "a high degree of 
probability that harm would actually result" O'Guin, 139 Idaho at 14 n. 1,72 P.3d at 854. 
There was no evidence of a high degree of probability of harm, let alone evidence of Erhart's 
actual or constructive knowledge of it. The steps and handrails were in place for almost 2-112 
years prior to the accident (Tr. Vo!' I, p. 88, 1. 10-13). Tenants and their invitees used the 
staircase daily without incident (ld at p. 127-28, L. 7-16). Plaintiffs offered no evidence that 
anyone other than Doolittle complained about the steps. And neither of plaintiff s two experts 
testified to the requisite high degree of probability. There was no evidence demonstrating a high 
probability of actual harm. 
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In denying defendants' jnov motion, the trial court stated: 
I have considered the testimony of Mr. Erhart in the context of this 
motion. He does acknowledge that he had a duty as a landlord to 
keep a safe premises; that it was his decision to leave out the two 
bolts; and that he did not consult the manufactUrer or his supplier 
in making the decision. He acknowledged that a shim would have 
allowed the two bolts to be put in place, but he chose not to use 
one because of the time involved. He acknowledged his repair to 
the stairway did not comply with the Uniform Building Code in 
many respects. This was just some of the evidence in the record 
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from which a jury could conclude Mr. Erhart was not as concerned 
with safety as he stated. There was also testimony from Mr. 
Doolittle that he advised Mr. Erhart of a loose tread (footnote 
omitted). Given the testimony of Dr. Gill regarding the need for a 
safety plan, Mr. Erhart's statement that he felt free to vary from 
code requirements, and the testimony of Mr. Fries that the building 
code is a minimmn safety standard, a jury could reasonably 
conclude that Mr. Erhart was aware that his repairs to the stairs 
created a high degree of risk of injury. A jury could likewise 
conclude that the injury to someone was likely. They could also 
conclude that Mr. Erhart should have known these things, given his 
hands on management of his rental property (R. Vol. III, p. 570, L. 
18 to p. 571, L. 9). 
The court's reasons do not justify its decision. Erhart did not consult the manufacturer or 
supplier because it was Sunday and the tenants would be returning the next day (Tr. Vol. I, p. 82, 
L. 5-12; Vol. I, p. 83, L. 25 to p. 84, L. 12). Even if Erhart made the wrong decision, he did not 
consciously disregard the safety of others, particularly given that Erhart had walked the steps and 
found them to be stable (Jd at p. 67, L. 10 to p. 68, L. 2; p. 85, L. 13-21). 
As for the shims, the court misconstrued the evidence. Plaintiffs asked: 
Q. Could you have put a shim, a wooden shim behind the 
brace? 
A. Well, certainly. 
Q. It wouldn't have been very hard to do? 
A. Well, it wouldn't have been able to be done that day (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 81, L. 23 to p. 82, L. 4). 
Those questions were asked in hindsight. Plaintiffs did not ask Erhart whether he considered 
using shims at the time he encountered the problem. Erhart did not testify that at the time of the 
installation he consciously rejected using shims. Erhart certainly did not testify that he 
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consciously disregarded a highly probable risk of hann. Besides, Erhart testified that he checked 
the steps and found no movement in them (Jd. at p. 67, L. 10-12). 
Likewise insufficient is the court's statement that "[Erhart] acknowledged his repairs to 
the stairway did not comply with the Uniform Building Code in many respects" (R. Vol. III, p. 
570, L. 22-23). First, the concrete steps themselves met the building code requirements (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 134, L. 4-8). Second, evidence of railing violations was not evidence of willful and wanton 
misconduct. Plaintiffu offered evidence that the handrails on the upper and lower sections of the 
staircase lacked a horizontal connector or a sufficient extension. Plaintiffs also offered evidence 
that the handrails were too wide and low. As for the horizontal connector/extension and the 
width of handrails, Erhart did not testifY that he was aware of those violations at the time of 
installation. He only testified that he was aware of them at the time of trial (Tr. Vol. I, p. 104, L. 
1-10). Plaintiffs offered no contrary evidence. As for the height of the handrail, Erhart was not 
seeking to change the height. He only planned to match the original height (Id. at p. 103, L. 3-7; 
p. 106, L. 15-22). Besides, plaintiffs did not question Erhart regarding his knowledge of the 
height requirement. At worst for the Erharts, the evidence of these violations was evidence of 
negligence. 
The court stated that "[t]here was also testimony from Mr. Doolittle that he advised Mr. 
Erhart of a loose tread" (R. Vol. III, p. 571, L. 2-3). But the court itself distinguished that 
testimony: "There is no evidence in the record as to which tread it was. Nor was Mr. Erhart 
questioned about Mr. Doolittle's warning" (Jd. at p. 571, L. 18-20 n. 1). Without proof of the 
stair involved or of Erhart's reaction to Doolittle's comment, plaintiffs' evidence is meaningless. 
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The court stated: 
Given the testimony of Dr. Gill regarding the need for a safety 
plan, Mr. Erhart's statement that he felt free to vary to from code 
requirements, and the testimony of Mr. Fries that the building code 
is a minimum safety standard, a jury could reasonably conclude 
that Mr. Erhart was aware that his repairs to the stairs created a 
high degree of risk of injury. (R. Vol. III, p. 571, L. 3-7). 
The court's premises do not support its conclusion. An expert's opinion about the need for a 
safety plan is not conclusive. Big Lost River Irrigation District v. Kulp, 78 Idaho 591, 595, 307 
P.2d 788, 790 (1957); State v. Patterson, 126 Idaho 227, 230, 880 P.2d 257, 260 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The failure to have a safety plan does not demonstrate a conscious disregard of the 
consequences. If the law were otherwise, virtually every homeowner would be guilty of willful 
and wanton misconduct. 
And Erhart did not state that he "felt free to vary from code requirements." Erhart 
testified that he was not required to obtain a building permit, a statement that no one rebutted 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 107, L. 4-22; p. 134, L. 10-18). Gill even admitted that he did not check City of 
Meridian law on the issue (Id. at p. 262, L. 24 to p. 263, L. 1). Erhart recognized that even 
without a building permit, he still needed to follow the code (/d. at p. 107, L. 23 to p. 108, L. 4). 
But plaintiffs offered no evidence that Erhart was consciously indifferent to the code. 
Fries' testimony that the building code is a minimum safety standard did not support the 
court's decision. Setting a minimum standard gives an owner the option to exceed it in a way 
that promotes greater safety. But the failure to meet a minimum standard is not evidence of 
willful and wanton misconduct. A failure may be negligent only, as flowing from inattention or 
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incompetence. A plaintiff must still prove both a conscious indifference to the consequences of 
violating the standard and actual or construction knowledge of a high probability of resulting 
harm. O'Guin, 139 Idaho at 14 n.l, 72 P.3d at 854 
The court stated: 
... a jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Erhart was aware 
that his repairs to the stairs created a high degree of risk of injury. 
The jury could likewise conclude that the injury to someone was 
likely. It could also conclude Mr. Erhart should have known these 
things, given his hands on management of his rental property. (R. 
Vol. III, p. 571, L. 5-9). 
There are many problems with the court's conclusion. There was no evidence that Erhart knew 
or should have known that his repairs "created a high degree of risk of injury." From actual 
testing, Erhart was aware that the steps did not move. He was totally unaware that the handrail 
was not fully attached. Moreover, there was no evidence that Erhart's conduct actually created a 
"high degree of risk." Tenants and others used the staircase without incident for about 2-112 
years. Only Doolittle complained about the steps. By stating that the jury could conclude that 
injury was "likely," the court misapplied the law. Plaintiffs needed to prove a "a high degree of 
probability of actual harm," not a mere likelihood. 0 'Guin, 139 Idaho at 14 n.l, 72 P.3d at 854. 
Plaintiffs offered no evidence on the subject. Finally, Erhart's "hands on management" is not 
evidence of a conscious indifference to consequences. It is just the opposite. Defendants' jnov 
motion should have been granted. 
Alternatively, the court abused its discretion by denying defendants' new-trial motion. 
The court said there was "substantial, conflicting evidence that could lead to either result" (R. 
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Vol. III, p. 577, L. 10-11). But the trial court did not identify all ofthe evidence so that this 
Court may review its analysis (Id. at L. 7). And the court did not identify the evidence that 
Erhart was consciously indifferent to a high probability of actual harm. 
If this verdict is upheld, the Supreme Court will turn garden-variety negligence cases into 
willful and wanton claims. That result is especially ironic here. Had Erhart made no repairs, he 
likely would have been found liable for negligence at worst. But because he undertook to 
upgrade the stairs, he was found liable for willful and wanton misconduct. The trial court's 
ruling will disserve the interests of safety by making property owners reluctant to make 
improvements. 
Defendants are entitled to jnov or a new trial as to willful and wanton misconduct. 
III. The Loss Of Consortium Award To Gale Phillips Is Excessive. 
The standards governing a challenge to an excessive verdict are well settled: 
Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or 
excessive damages, the trial court must weight the evidence and 
then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had 
there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the 
trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand. It need not be proven that 
there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to 
such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient. A trial 
court is not restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or excessive 
"as a matter oflaw." Blaine v. Byers, supra. Additionally, the rule 
that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial 
but conflicting evidence has no application to a trial court ruling 
upon a motion for a new trial. Blaine, supra; Rosenberg v. Toetly, 
93 Idaho 135,456 P.2d 779 (1969) (emphasis in original). 
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625-26, 603 P.2d 575, 580-81 (1979); Quick v. Crane, III 
Idaho 759, 768, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986). If the difference can only be explained by "some 
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unfair behavior, or what the law calls 'passion or prejudice' " by the jury against a party, then the 
trial court should grant a new trial. Quick, III Idaho at 769,727 P.2d at 1197; Harger v. Teton 
Springs Golf and Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716,718, 184 P.2d 841,843 (2008). This Court 
reviews the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, which includes whether the trial 
court acted within the legal standards applicable to the claim. Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 569, 
181 P.3d 489,495 (2008). The loss of consortium award is excessive, and the trial court abused 
its discretion by not ordering a new trial or a remittitur. 
As discussed, the loss of consortium award must first be reduced to the statutory 
maximum ($257,590.13) because of the cap on non-economic damages. I.C. §6-1603(1) and 
(4)(a). But even at that level, the award is excessive. A claim for loss of consortium is not a 
claim for a spouse's own personal physical injuries. Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 
107 Idaho 389, 394, 690 P.2d 324, 329 (1984). It is a" 'wholly derivative cause of action 
contingent upon a third party's tortious injury to a spouse.'" Zaleha v. Rosholt Robertson & 
Tucker, Chtd, 131 Idaho 254, 256, 953 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1998). The extent of the injury to the 
injured spouse will determine the scope of the loss of consortium. Id. 
"Loss of consortium" covers material services, companionship, love, felicity, support, 
aid, protection, affection, and sexual relations lost by the claiming spouse. Nichols v. Sonneman, 
91 Idaho 199,205,418 P.2d 562,568 (1966), citing Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811,813 
(D.C. Cir. 1950), and DuffY v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71, 73 (D. Mont. 1961). 
Given its limited scope, a loss of consortium award should be far less than an award to the 
injured spouse. See Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F. 2d 963,973 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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In fact, Idaho cases show that loss of consortium awards are much less than the 
underlying awards. E.g., Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 748, 86 P.3d 458, 462 (2004) 
($91,200.00/$820,800.00 - nine times less); Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 306, 32 P.3d 
695,698 (Idaho App. 2001) ($1,948.51 to plaintiff, no loss of consortium); Brown v. Ringel, 134 
Idaho 6,10,995 P.2d 351,355 (2000) ($2,000.00/$32,000.00 -sixteen times less); Beale v. 
Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 525, 903 P.2d 110, 113 (Idaho App. 1995) ($500.00/$11,218.00-
twenty-two times less); Adams v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 74, 856 P.2d 864 (1993) 
($2,000.00/$28,000.00 -fourteen times less); Casey v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 13, 15,921 P.2d 190, 
192 (Idaho App. 1996) ($50,000.00/$278,733.00 -five times less); Barnett v. Eagle 
Helicopters, Inc., 123 Idaho 361, 363, 848 P.2d 419,420 (1993) ($256,960.00/$843,000.00-
three times less); Pearce v. Ollie, 121 Idaho 539, 540, 826 P.2d 888, 889 (1992) ($150,000.00 
for plaintiff; no loss of consortium); Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 504, 757 P.2d 1222, 
1223 (Idaho App. 1988) ($2,500.00 for plaintiff; no loss of consortium); Vannoy v. Uniroyal 
Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 538, 726 P.2d 648, 650 (1986) ($74,895.00/$224,688.00 - three times 
less); McDonaldv. Safoway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305, 306, 707 P.2d 416,417 (1985) 
($35,000.00/$196,000.00 -five times less); Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 
Idaho 389, 392, 690 P.2d 324, 327 (1984) ($100,000.00/$825,000.00 - eight times less); Seppi 
v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 187,579 P.2d 683,684 (1978); ($2,330.40 for plaintiff; no loss of 
consortium); Rindlesbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 755, 519 P.2d 421,424 (1974) 
($15,000.00/$400,000.00 - 26 times less); Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199,202,418 P.2d 
562;565 (1966) ($1,200.00/$19,305.70 -fifteen times less). On average, a loss of consortium 
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award is eleven times less, or about nine percent of the injured spouse's verdict. By great 
contrast, Gale Phillips' award was over 50% of her husband's total award. It was almost 99% of 
her husband's non-economic award (Vol. II, p. 336, L. 23 to p. 337, L. 1). 
Without trivializing Gale Phillips' damages, they paled in comparison to the her 
husband's damages. Phillips came to the emergency room with a closed head injury that caused 
a loss of consciousness, contusions on a leg, abrasions on his face andlor neck, a tom right 
rotator cuff ultimately requiring surgery, a disc problem, a broker jaw, and a broken tooth (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 311, L. 19 to p. 312, Line 14; p. 367, L. 5-7; p. 410, L. 12-15; p. 421, L. 14-17; p. 433, 
L. 20-24; p. 904, L. 4-7). He was agitated, anxious, and intermittently confused and forgetful 
(Id. at p. 417, L. 3-7). Phillips received large doses of morphine for his severe pain (Id at p. 413, 
L. 18 to p. 414, L. 20). Phillips suffered a traumatic brain injury and post-concussive syndrome, 
including problems with forgetfulness, decreased short-term memory, blurred vision, difficulty 
with light exposure, problems with sleeping, balance, dizziness, nausea, hot flashes, taste 
changes, trouble focusing and spelling, and personality changes (Tr. Vol. I, p. 312, L. 15-17; p. 
437, L. 8-21). He would become emotional and irritable (Id at p. 324, L. 25 to p. 325, L. 12). 
Phillips suffered mild cognitive deficits and depression and a little PTSD (Id. at p. 347, L. 3-8; p. 
349, L. 16-18). He was treated by a battery of physicians and therapists (Id. at p. 588, L. 23 to p. 
589, L. 13). He has been permanently placed on at least four medications (Id at p. 440, L. 11 to 
p. 441, L. 24). He has developed a nervous eye tick (Id. at p. 619, L. 21 to p. 621, L. 2). At the 
time of trial, Phillips was still very nervous, anxious, and fidgety (Id at p. 440, L. 6-10; p. 442, 
43 
1266325.1 
L. 11-16). Improvements notwithstanding, Philips suffered permanent disabilities from the 
accident (Id. at p. 385, L. 22 to p. 386, L. 6; p. 609, L. 21 to p. 610, L. 9). 
Lay witnesses testified about Phillips' condition. Work supervisor George Schendler 
stated that Phillips had significant memory issues requiring him to take notes and that he 
physically shook at work (R. Vol. III, p. 489 at p. 29, L. 7-16). Co-worker Ron Sundberg 
testified to Phillips' problems with memory and organization (Tr. Vol. I, p. 639, L. 21 to p. 640, 
L. 14). Co-worker Angela Sisco testified that Phillips was no longer a funny, gregarious, and 
outgoing person (Id. at p. 525, L. 1 to p. 526, L. 3). Phillips' performance ratings fell below 
expectations (R. Vol. III, p. 527 at p. 19, L. 5-12). 
Phillips became afraid of the water and could no longer dive for abalone, an activity he 
had enjoyed since his youth (Tr. Vol. I, p. 280, L. 11-25; p. 632, L. 5 to p. 633, L. 2). He was 
uncomfortable driving his own boat, he would get easily disoriented on hunting trips and lost if 
left alone (Id. at p. 690, L. 20 to p. 692, L. 23; p. 693, L. 6 to p. 694, L. 6). He would get very 
frustrated and cry over mistakes (Id. at p. 843, L. 15 to p. 846, L. 10). 
Phillips' marriage did suffer because of the accident. But at 99% of her husband's non-
economic damages and over 50% of his total award, Gale Phillips' award is excessive. It carmot 
be rationally explained based on the evidence. 
Without revealing its own calculations as required by Dinneen, the trial court admitted 
that its non-economic awards to each plaintiff would have been lower (R. Vol. III, p. 579, L. 8-
9). The court found Gale Phillips to be "somewhat over-dramatic and self interested" (ld. at p. 
579, L. 3). So the court definitely recognized problems with the size of her award. Nonetheless, 
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it concluded that the award was not so high "as to show the jury was operating under the 
influence of passion or prejudice" (Id. at p. 580, L. 3-4). The court abused its discretion. 
The court applied an incorrect legal standard. Defendants were not required to "show" 
that the jury was actually influenced by passion and prejudice. The mere appearance of passion 
and prejudice is sufficient. Dinneen, 100 Idaho at 625-26; Wilson v. JR. Simp/at Co., 143 Idaho 
730,732,152 P.3d 601,603 (2007). Gale Phillips' award was so high, so close to her husband's 
award, and so out of kilter with the surveyed awards, that an appearance of passion and prejudice 
existed. 
And the award was a product of actual passion and prejudice. Plaintiffs wrongly injected 
a willful and wanton misconduct claim into a case involving negligence at worst. By doing so, 
they incited the jury's passions against Milt Erhart. During trial, plaintiffs co-worker Angela 
Sisco testified that requested repairs were "either half-assed completed or not done or pushed 
off' and so the stairway condition was "no surprise" (Tr. Vol. I, p. 530, L. 4-6). Yet Sisco 
admitted that she brought complaints to the person in charge of maintenance, not Erhart (/d. at 
530, L. 7-12). So there was no reason to offer Sisco's testimony other than to smear Erhart. 
During closing argument, plaintiffs argued that Milt Erhart had a "reckless perspective" 
regarding the staircase and was a "reckless fellow who can't take any responsibility for what he's 
done" (Id. at p. 1013, L. 2-3; p. 1016, L. 8-10). Plaintiffs used those types of comments to 
foment anger against Erhart, an anger reflected in Gale Phillips' award. 
The award wrongly included damages not recoverable as a loss of consortium. Gale 
Phillips was entitled to recover for the loss of her husband's services, support, affection, and 
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sexual relations. But plaintiffs offered evidence that Gale Phillips needed to take medications 
and seek counseling (Tr. Vol. I, p. 912, L. 12-16). She did not bring a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 466, 210 P.3d 563, 574 
(2009). Gale Phillips offered evidence that she needed to help her husband with work or health 
issues. But a loss of consortium claim covers services that an injured person can no longer 
provide, not services that a spouse must now provide. See Evans v. Buffington Harbor River 
Boats, LLe, 799 N.E.2d 1103, 1113-14 (Ind. App. 2003). Besides, plaintiffs did not offer 
evidence of the monetary value of Gale Phillips' services. Evans, 799 N.E.2d at 1113. 
Plaintiffs also wrongly used Gale Phillips' claim to recover for family losses. Gale 
Phillips testified that her husband could no longer help their sons with homework (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
909, L. 25 to p. 910, L. 1). Her sons' friends could not visit at home because they made too 
much noise for her husband (Id at p. 910, L. 1-9). She was angry that Phillips could not speak to 
the boys about subjects requiring a father's involvement (ld. at p. 913, L. 13 to p. 914, L. 8). But 
Idaho does not recognize a claim for loss of a parental consortium. Green v. A.B. Hagglund and 
Saner, 634 F. Supp. 790, 796-7 (D. Idaho 1986). 
Through Gale Phillips' claim, plaintiffs sought unrecoverable damages. Gale Phillips 
testified that Philips "is not [in] our unit anymore," and "we're not that tight knit [family], joking 
with each other and, you know, 'How was your day?' "(Id at p. 910, L. 12-14). After 
requesting $1 million on her claim, plaintiffs stated: 
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That says it, I tell you. That says what these values are. That says 
we, as a society, value this part ofthe harms and losses that this 
family has and is and will endure. 
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Is a million dollars enough? Of course not. But a million dollars 
says the right thing. I'd say the last line of the verdict form, that's 
what should go there. 
Do you have to? No. Is it the right thing to do? I submit to you it 
is. You've seen the losses to this family that has made the right 
choices. (Id. at p. 1052, 1. 11-22; emphasis supplied). 
In Wilson, this Court ruled that a closing argument statement as to the damages may have 
aroused the passions of the jury. 143 Idaho at 732,152 P.3d at 603. By playing on the 
unrecoverable family loss, Gale Phillips obtained an excessive award for loss of consortium. 
The trial court abused its discretion by upholding Gale Phillips' award. Defendants are 
entitled to a new trial as to her damages. Alternatively, this Court should remit her award to 
$52,000.00, an amount over ten percent of the sum of James Phillips' adjusted economic 
damages award ($253,014.39) plus the statutory maximum non-economic damages award 
($257,590.13). I.C. §16-603. At the very least, this Court should remand the issue for further 
consideration in light of Dinneen. The trial court erroneously failed to reveal its own calculation 
as to Gale Phillips' damages so that it may be compared to the jury's award. Dinneen, 100 Idaho 
at 625,603 P.2d at 580. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants-appellants Milt E. Erhart and Mary C. Erhart urge 
this Honorable Court to enter an order vacating the jury verdict; reversing the judgment, 
amended judgment, and memorandum decision and order, and entering judgment in favor of 
i 
. I defendants-appellants, with costs. Alternatively, defendants urge this Court to: (a) order a new 
trial as to liability and damages, (b) order a new trial as to Gale Phillips' damages, (c) enter a 
47 
1266325.1 
remittitur of Gale Phillips' damages to $52,000 or such other amount that this Court deems just, 
or (d) remand the issue of Gale Phillips' damages to the district court with instructions to analyze 
the issue under the Dinneen standard, all with costs to defendants. 
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